Opinionated Dissonance in the War on Terror

The terror attacks in London have resuscitated the debate on the best means for combating international terrorism. One group points to the attacks in London to illustrate the frivolity of Pres. Bush’s claim of “fighting the terrorists abroad,” as a deterrent to terrorism. The other group uses the absence of an attack on US soil to prove the viability of the Bush administration’s war on terror. The passionately intense debates point to varying perceptions of American hegemony as the culmination of the US war on terror. After the deafening debates, the silence returns. One thing they all seem to agree upon is that the US needs to win the war on terror. Their differences are mainly in the “how.” The emptiness fills with the absence of a “right” response to the questions – “Is there a perfect way to fight international terrorism?”

Many have advocated a journey to the root of international terrorism – addressing issues pertaining to religion, poverty and democratization in the Middle East. However, no one has sought to understand why the potent combination of Islam, poverty and authoritarianism in Africa has not produced global terrorists. Or is my perception made moot by recent assumptions that state weakness and failure in Africa would inevitably breed terrorism. Here, there is the need to delineate between the creation of sanctuary and financial channels for international terrorist organizations, and the nestling of terrorists.

State failure in Somalia points to evidence of terrorism in Africa. However, for every subjective presentation of Somalia, I will point to Nigeria, which has one of the largest Muslim populations in Africa. I would also point to the war in Algeria, which has received very little coverage in the Western media. Algeria is peculiar by the nature, duration and execution of the conflict. Despite the protracted confrontation between the fundamentalist Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA), and the Algerian government, Algeria has not become a major export for international terrorism.

Hence, eliminating the variables of Islam, poverty and authoritarianism, there is the nexus between foreign policy and domestic policy formation, which approaches the causal core of international terrorism. This touches the international governmental networks, which sustain the repressive governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These two countries provide the greatest manpower in the command and control of terror operations. They also remain terrorist sanctuaries in the Middle East.

The argument that ensues is one, which supports democratization and free society as a panacea to international terrorism. Here, the democratic end does not justify the belligerent means, which the United States has used to impose democratization in Iraq. Questions abound as to how to negotiate the entry of the Muslim Brotherhood (Gamaat al Islamiya) into mainstream Egyptian politics without ceding segments of governance to them. Governance is a complex issue. Given nascent theoretical belief in the human quest and value for freedom, not even citizens of Middle Eastern countries would opt for oppression when faced with a choice between oppression and freedom.

Through the free interaction of Islamic and secular forces in the Middle East states, an acceptable system of governance will emerge for people in the region. These countries would need to go through constitutional restructuring processes built on the interactive foundation of debate, discussion and referenda; the media landscape would need to be liberalized to accommodate dissonant voices; the economic landscape would need to be de-clientized to encourage private enterprise in service provision.

In the long run, democracy could be enabled from abroad, however it would never be imposed from abroad. Only so, would the forces of international terrorism be contained and would terrorist forces find expression, which they crave, within their respective communities.