Côte d’Ivoire’s Untenable Peace

A few days ago, I was talking with a friend about the precarious nature of the peace in Côte d’Ivoire. It’s as simple as this: when a peace process is predicated upon personalities prior to addressing group interests and positional dynamics, it is bound to collapse in the long run. This unless, the personalities give up the cause they feel they have a legitimate claim to pursue. Hence the countervailing responsibility between groups and their leaders, and vice versa, in times of conflict. Experience from protracted social conflicts lend credence to this claim – Angola, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka etc.

This morning, renewed violence in Duekoue, points to the fragility of the Pretoria Accords. However, the watershed for renewed and sustained violence is the October 2005 Presidential election. Take a look at the October 2005 electoral scenario. It is a one-shot election. Alasane Dramane Ouattara’s (ADO) candidacy has been accepted, not based upon the “nationality clause” but based on “special presidential decree.” Hence, the “ivoirite” concept is still very much alive. Soro Guillaume’s Forces Nouvelles are convinced that ADO would win an election against Henri Konan Bedie (HKB) or Laurent Koudou Gbagbo (LKG). Doesn’t one love Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential acronyms? To fully capture the precarious nature of the peace in Côte d’Ivoire, it becomes necessary to explore the scenario of potential outcomes. Since that could come at a later time, at the moment, it is important to explore the weaknesses in the Pretoria Accords.

What the Pretoria Accords succeeded in doing was to procrastinate fissures in Côte d’Ivoire. Here’s how:

• Accepting that ADO present his candidacy for the elections, does not guarantee its fairness.
  What if ADO wins? What if LKG wins? What if HKB wins? How would the FN react?
• In case there is any contest in the elections, the battle lines are already drawn between North and South for renewed conflict.
• There is a misplaced faith in the electoral process as a consensus-building process. However, we all know how polarizing elections could be even in the most democratically entrenched traditions.
• The demilitarization process thus far is slow and suspicious, precluding any kind of trust-building between the contending parties.
• The accords did not create the requisite platform for peace-building.
  

Based on all these factors, I will bet on renewed violence in Côte d’Ivoire, post-election. I am not merely being afro-pessimistic here, I would hope that there are more positive outcomes, but let’s look into the past to attempt this projection into the future, four months down the road.